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ABSTRACT
This study investigates whether individuals’ attitudes towards democracy and 
secular politics have any influence on voting behaviour in Egypt. Based on data 
from survey conducted immediately after the Egyptian parliamentary elections 
in January 2012, this study finds that Egyptians’ attitudes towards democratic 
governance were quite negative around the parliamentary elections, yet Egyptians 
still endorsed democracy as the ideal political system for their country. However, 
empirical findings suggest that support for democracy has a limited impact on 
electoral results. On the other hand, the main division in Egyptian society around 
the first free and fair parliamentary elections was the religious–secular cleavage. As 
people support secular politics more, they become significantly less likely to vote 
for Islamist parties. These results illustrate that preferences in regard to the type 
of the democracy – either a liberal and secular or a religious democracy – were 
the main determinant of the historic 2012 elections in Egypt.
Introduction
For close to a decade, scholars have found that the majority of citizens of Middle 
Eastern countries has a positive attitude towards democratic forms of govern-
ment (Tessler, 2002a; Tessler & Gao, 2005; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Ciftci, 2010, 
2012) and that they are also very religious and favour Islamic forms of govern-
ment (Jamal, 2006; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Ciftci, 2012). These studies show that 
support for a democratic regime and a high degree of religiosity can coexist. 
Moreover, the majority of citizens in the Middle East favour democracy is not 
surprising given that previous studies on other post-authoritarian countries 
– e.g. post-Communist countries – showed that the citizenry had similar pre-
dispositions in the early 1990s (Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Miller et al., 1997; 
Mishler & Rose, 1997; Haerpfer, 2008). However, exactly how these attitudes 
towards regime type and religion affect the way individuals vote is a question 
that remains to be answered.
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This question has been neglected in the literature due to the absence of prior 
experience with democratic transitions in the Middle East. Egypt and Tunisia 
are the only Middle Eastern countries with appropriate electoral context where 
this question could be investigated. In the light of the Arab Uprisings, it is now 
possible to consider how best to answer it. The 2011–2012 parliamentary elec-
tions held after the removal of Mubarak in Egypt provide an opportunity to 
understand the factors shaping Egyptian citizens’ voting decisions. This election 
is particularly significant, not only because it was the first relatively free and fair 
elections held in Egypt, but it afforded Egyptian citizens a chance to express 
their choice for the future of their country: A conservative and religious democ-
racy under the Muslim Brotherhood government or a liberal democracy under 
the coalition of secular forces – the Egyptian Bloc and al-Wafd. The Egyptian 
Parliament was not allowed to complete its main task of appointing a commit-
tee that would be in charge of drafting a new constitution due to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court of Egypt forced parliament dissolved in June 2012. Yet, 
this does not undermine the importance of the 2011–2012 elections as the 
only official measure of ‘Egyptians’ political sentiments regarding the direction 
of the transition’ (Elsayyad & Hanafy, 2014). Another important aspect of these 
elections is that Egypt has always been one of the most influential countries 
in the MENA region, and Islamist victory as a result of the elections could have 
had a significant impact on other countries in the region.
This study presents some interesting results. First of all, according to the 
results of the original survey, on average, Egyptian people are highly sceptical 
of democratic governance inasmuch as they do not believe democracies are 
good at solving economic, social, or political problems. Yet, despite this scep-
ticism, Egyptians still consider democracy to be the ideal political system for 
their country. Second, the statistical analysis presented herein on party choice 
suggests that support for democracy does not have a noticeable influence on 
electoral outcomes. Third, whereas an individual’s strong pro-religion attitude 
does not affect party choice in Egypt, an individual’s strong support for secular 
politics does affect that choice. One way to interpret these results is that the 
majority of Egyptian citizens agree that democracy should be instituted as the 
political system in Egypt but that disagreement on the type of the democracy 
and, therefore, electoral competition is part and parcel of systems of this nature. 
In other words, people who vote for the Islamist parties may imagine a relatively 
conservative and religious democracy whereas those who vote for more secular 
parties want to see a relatively liberal and secular democracy at work in Egypt.
The present study makes several contributions to the literature on the Middle 
East and elections in transitional democracies. First, it draws on an original elec-
tion survey conducted for this study on attitudes towards democracy and the 
role of religion in politics. Second, it is one of the very few studies to date on 
voting behaviour at the individual level in Egypt in the post-Mubarak era. There 
are few empirical studies, using aggregated data, focusing on either electoral 
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processes in the Middle East (Kurzman & Naqvi, 2010; Al-Ississ and Atallah 2015). 
Finally, the study demonstrates that the secular–religious cleavage has a deci-
sive effect on individual votes, whereas support for democracy and many other 
demographic factors have a null effect.
First, this article surveys the extent literature on support for democracy and 
the role of religion in politics in the Middle East. Second, the study scrutinizes 
the voters’ preferences over support for democracy and secular politics in the 
2011–2012 Egyptian electoral process. Third, it provides substantive information 
on the specifics of the original survey data and the statistical analysis. Forth, 
it discusses the results of the analysis and finally deliberates future areas of 
research and broader implications of democratization in the Middle East region.
Support for democracy
Scholars, including Inglehart (2003), Jamal and Tessler (2008) and Diamond 
(1999), have argued that for a country to successfully transition to a democratic 
system requires citizens to believe in and commit to the legitimacy of democ-
racy. The commitment to democracy on the part of the elites and institutions 
that ensure checks and balances in new democracies may fail if the losers in new 
regimes are nostalgic about the past and political leaders use this to mobilize 
people against the new order. That is, a democratic system can only be consol-
idated when the majority believes this form of government to be preferable to 
any other regime type and when there is no significant support for the previous 
regime. A vast literature on post-Communist countries is devoted to examining 
the democratic orientations of citizens of these new democracies to determine 
whether and under what circumstances the transition to democracy has been 
followed by consolidation (Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Miller et al., 1997; Mishler 
& Rose, 1997; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Haerpfer, 2008). All these studies found 
that a strong sense of nostalgia and dissatisfaction with the performance of 
political and economic institutions in new democracies results in either military 
intervention or backlash of elites of the old regime. And, although scholars 
have developed extensive theories and knowledge pertaining to the level and 
determinants of support for democracy in post-Communist countries, the effect 
of support for democracy on electoral choice is a relatively understudied area. A 
handful of these studies, based on survey research, have shown that those who 
support reforms for political and economic liberalization are more likely to vote 
for parties associated with the newly established democratic forces, whereas 
those who are dissatisfied with new democratic regimes are likely to vote for 
the previous regime’s parties (Mason & Sidorenko-Stephenson, 1997; Powers & 
Cox, 1997; Miller et al., 1998; WVS, 2000).
As a region associated where democratic countries are few and far between, 
the Middle East has only recently gained significant attention from democrati-
zation scholars. Motivated by Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis, scholars 
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have designed and implemented surveys in order to determine whether or 
not Muslims are unfavourable and unsympathetic towards democracy (Tessler, 
2002a, 2002b; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Robbins & Tessler, 2012). In general, findings 
for citizens’ support for democracy in the Middle East have given cause for a 
sense of cautious optimism. A number of studies have found that support for 
democracy in most Arab countries is high (Tessler, 2002b; Tessler & Jamal, 2006; 
Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Tessler et al., 2012; Regt, 2013; Ciftci, 2010). For example, 
Jamal (2012) reported that on average more than 85 per cent of citizens in 
the Middle East support democracy. Moreover, it has been shown that strong 
support for religion in these Middle Eastern countries does not necessarily hin-
der support for democracy (Tessler, 2002a; Jamal, 2006; Hofmann, 2004; Ciftci, 
2012). Al-Braizat (2002) found that Egypt had the highest level of support for 
democracy among all the Muslim-majority countries in the region.
In order to determine the relationship between support for democracy along 
with other factors and party choice during the transition period, an original 
survey1 was designed and conducted. The survey was held between 12 and 25 
January 2012 immediately after the parliamentary elections in order to measure 
the extent to which the citizenry supported democracy in the transition process. 
The first set, which comprised three items, was designed to assess governance 
in democracies, and respondents were asked to answer by selecting an option 
ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ on a five-point scale:
(1)  In democracies, the economic system runs poorly.
(2)  Democracies are indecisive and have too much quarrels.
(3)  Democracies are not good at maintaining order.
The second set comprised only one item intended to get at the extent to 
which the respondents supported the view that democracy is the ideal political 
system:
(1)  Democracies may have problems, but they are better than any other 
system.
The responses, as presented in Table 1, suggest that the majority of Egypt’s 
citizens continued to regard democracy as the ideal political system although a 
very high percentage of the respondents reported being disappointed with the 
economic instability and political chaos experienced in Egypt dating from the 
January 25 Revolution. Seventy-two per cent of the respondents either agreed 
or strongly agreed that democracies are not good at running an economy or 
maintaining order, and 65 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that democra-
cies are not good at decision-making processes. On the other hand, only 14 
per cent rejected the statement that democracy is the ideal political system 
compared to alternatives.2 These descriptive numbers show that despite having 
significant misgivings Egyptians, on average, overwhelmingly preferred a dem-
ocratic regime over the alternatives despite widespread dissatisfaction with the 
Constitution, the timing of the elections and the electoral rules.
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After the Arab Uprisings, anxiety about instability and economic problems 
discouraged people from putting their entire trust in democratic governance.3 
Moreover, a detailed and insightful consideration of the experiences of the peo-
ple who were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statements 
presented about democracy can offer some other hints related to the decline 
of support for democratic governance in Egypt after the uprisings. On the other 
hand, Robbins (2015) argues that Arab Uprisings did not have a negative influ-
ence on citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. He compared the results of the 
second and third waves of Arab Barometer and showed that there has been a 
modest change in terms of Egyptians’ attitudes towards democracy. While, on 
average, 26 per cent of survey respondents were agreeing that democracy is 
bad for the economy, ineffective in maintaining the order, indecisive and citizens 
are unprepared for democracy in 2010–2011, this percentage went up to 27 per 
cent in the third wave in 2013. Regardless of the level of support for democracy 
at different periods and different empirical data, it is important to investigate the 
significance of citizens’ attitudes towards democracy and their possible impact 
on the voting decision they made in the first and only democratic elections they 
had in 2011 and 2012.
Support for religious versus secular politics
The secular–religious cleavage has long been a feature of Middle Eastern politics, 
and Egyptian politics are no exception. Nevertheless, this cleavage was less visi-
ble in the public sphere during the Mubarak era because of the oppressive tools 
of the regime. There was constant pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood, consid-
ered as the most organized and popular Islamist group in Egypt. Throughout the 
period immediately following the successful revolutionary movement in Egypt, 
a number of politicized and revolutionary groups became more active and vis-
ible, thus bringing a new focus to the secular–religious cleavage in society. At 
the beginning of the uprisings, revolutionary secular and Islamist groups had 
organized protests together; however, cooperation of this nature slowly gave 
way to competition over whether the new political system would be a secular or 
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Table 1. Support for democratic governance/democracy as ideal regime in Egypt.
Democracies are not good at
  Economy (%)
Decision-making 
(%)
Maintaining 
order (%)
Democracy is a 
better political 
system (%)
Strongly disagree 5 6 4 5
Disagree 10 12 10 9
Partly agree 13 16 14 23
Agree 36 33 37 34
Strongly agree 36 32 35 29
N 905 907 900 904
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religious one. Due to this increasing competition between the groups, multiple 
protests in favour of both sides of the debate have taken place in the streets of 
Egypt’s cities, which may have the consequence of impeding or even reversing 
popular opinion in favour of establishing a democratic system of governance, 
as discussed in the previous section.
It is reasonable to argue that any study on democratization in the Middle 
East that does not examine the relationship between religion and the state 
and attitudes towards that relationship is necessarily incomplete. On this point, 
numerous scholars have taken the view that religion and democracy in the 
Middle East are fundamentally at odds. For example, Huntington (1993), Lewis 
(1997) and Kedourie (2013) have all argued that the coalescence of Islam and 
politics constitutes the main reason for the lack of democracy in the Arab world. 
However, other scholars have challenged this claim. Stepan (2011) and Linz 
and Stepan (1996), raise the important point that none of the major theories of 
democratization posit secularism as an essential condition for democratization. 
Stepan (2000) argues that democratization does not require secularism. Instead, 
in his view, the consolidation of democracy in Muslim-majority societies requires 
only what he refers to as ‘twin toleration’ – a minimum degree of mutual toler-
ance between political institutions and religious authorities. The most important 
aspect of Stepan’s argument, however, is his claim that the required minimum 
tolerance level depends on the extent to which the most of the citizens want 
religious doctrines to be incorporated into the constitution of the new system. 
Nonetheless, the debate over the role of religion in a political regime goes to the 
heart of the discussion of democracy in the Middle East (Ardic, 2012), and the 
evidence suggests that support for the inclusion of religious values and norms 
into politics is higher in the Middle East than it is in other regions in the world 
(Tessler & Gao, 2005; Ciftci, 2012).
Studies conducted before the Arab Uprisings suggest that there is a high 
degree of support for the role of Islam in politics in the Middle East. Citing the 
Gallup World Poll of 2007, Esposito (2008) argues that Muslims want to see a 
religious form of democracy – a democracy that allows for the incorporation of 
Islamic teachings into the political system. The same survey found that 66 per 
cent of Egyptians wanted Sharia as the only source of legislation (Esposito, 2008: 
8). Regt (2013) explored what democracy means to the people of the region and 
found that a great deal of support for granting religious leaders a role in making 
laws in a democratic regime. Tessler (2011) suggests that neither the relationship 
between religion and politics nor a high degree of support for the influence of 
religion on politics act as an impediment to the citizenry’s development of a 
positive attitude towards democracy.
In the aftermath of the fall of the Mubarak regime, the growing concern 
that Islamists would dominate governance as an electoral outcome in the new 
democratic era intensified the discord between Islamist and secular forces 
based on a number of factors. First, the debate about religious minority rights, 
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women’s rights and other salient issues became very hot in the pre-election 
period as political parties announced their platforms and ran their campaigns. 
Even though the Islamist parties, especially the FJP, softened their claims and 
policy promises before the elections, a large segment of Egyptian society was 
concerned that an FJP and al-Nour government would fail to deliver on promises 
pertaining to such matters as protecting the rights of women and members of 
minority groups. These kinds of fears possibly divided Egyptian society further 
on the role of Islam in new Egypt. Second, in contrast with the pre-revolution 
era, the demand for Sharia was no longer an abstract one, and the question now 
became whether people wanted the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) or the Salafis’ 
version of Islam, or a more secular version of the religion. In order to determine 
the extent of the popular support for religious versus secular politics during 
Egypt’s transition period, I turn to the public-opinion data.
Table 2 presents the degree of support for secular politics during the tran-
sition process in Egypt. The respondents were presented with several items 
regarding the role of religion in politics. Three items were adapted from the WVS 
for the sake of comparison and because they are widely used and accepted in 
the literature. The respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with the following statements using the same five-point scale out-
lined earlier.
(1)  Religion and government should be separate.
(2)  Religious officials and leaders should not influence how people vote 
in elections.
(3)  Religious officials and leaders should not influence government 
decisions.
In regard to the first item, 44 per cent of people wanted a separation of reli-
gion and government, whereas 41 per cent did not want this. Similar divisions 
are apparent in regard to the other two items. Respondents’ opinions on the 
influence of religious officials and leaders in elections were split evenly: 43 per 
cent agreed that religious actors should not influence how people vote, and 
another 43 per cent disagreed. Likewise, 53 per cent opposed the idea that 
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Table 2. Support for secularism in Egypt.
  Involvement of religious leaders
 
Separation of religion 
and politics (%) In electoral choices (%) In Government (%)
Strongly disagree 29 18 16
Disagree 12 15 15
Partly agree 15 14 16
Agree 15 21 24
Strongly agree 29 32 29
N 958 945 940
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religious leaders should influence government decisions, whereas 31 per cent 
thought that religious leaders should have such influence.
Voters’ preferences over support for democracy and secular 
politics
Studies using the WVS, the Arab Barometer and other polls show that support for 
democracy in the Middle East is high among those who support Sharia (Tessler, 
2002b; Ciftci, 2012). As discussed, most Egyptians agreed that democracy is the 
best political system, but the nature of democracy they want to see in Egypt is 
still unknown. A recent study shows that Egyptians are more likely to support 
a religious democracy than a secular one (Ciftci, 2012). Moreover, differences in 
Islamist parties’ discourses regarding democracy during the Mubarak era and 
reflecting in the campaigns for the 2011–2012 elections also indicate that a 
citizen’s support for democracy may not hinder him/her from voting for an 
Islamist party (Al-Anani, 2012). Even though the positions of the Islamist par-
ties, i.e., the FJP and al-Nour, on the place of religion in the Constitution and 
political system of the ‘new Egypt’ during the campaign were almost identical, 
there were variations among the positions of three of the other main parties, 
i.e., al-Wafd, al-Wasat and the Egyptian Bloc. Al-Wasat adopted a middle ground 
by defending Islamic laws ‘in a manner consistent with the values of a liberal 
democratic system.’4 The Egyptian Bloc was the most supportive of a secular 
constitution, followed by al-Wafd.
A close look at the parties’ programmes and electoral campaigns provides 
empirical evidence for the theoretical expectations regarding the impact of 
support for democracy and secularization on voting choices. During the elec-
toral campaign, there were two Islamist coalitions. The first was the Democratic 
Alliance, which was dominated by the FJP, but also included some small liberal 
and Nasserist parties. During the campaign, the members of the Alliance pro-
fessed their commitment to democratic procedures and advocated for reducing 
poverty and increasing spending for the poor, and they abandoned Mubarak-
era slogans such as ‘Islam is the Solution’ (Al-Anani, 2012). In addition, the FJP 
selected a Coptic Christian, Rafiq Habib, as its third in command and negotiated 
with non-Islamist parties to establish a coalition. In doing so, the party hoped 
to signal to domestic and international audiences that it did not have a secret 
religious agenda. Nevertheless, many liberals and secularists remained sceptical 
of the Islamist parties’ stance on the rights and representation of women and 
religious minorities (Al-Anani, 2012). They referred to the MB’s frequent use of 
Islamic references to appeal to the electorate and claimed that the FJP’s rein-
vention of itself was purely cosmetic in nature. The prevailing belief was that 
the party’s agenda remained focused on shaping society in accordance with 
Islamic law (Masoud, 2014).
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The second Islamist coalition is the Salafi alliance, which was led by the 
al-Nour Party and included a Salafi party, Al-Asala and another small Islamist 
party. Before and during the January 25 Revolution, the Salafist movement 
consisted of poorly organized groups led mostly by preachers who wanted 
to propagate their doctrines. As Gauvain (2010) has argued, Salafis in Egypt 
shunned politics as religiously prohibited (haram) and focused instead on puri-
fying society in line with Quran and Sunnah. Their political approach towards 
religion enabled them to enlarge their sphere of influence, as Mubarak con-
doned their activities as a counterbalance against the political Islam of the MB 
(Chalcraft, 2014). As the anti-Mubarak demonstrations unfolded, these groups 
took a firm position against the removal of Mubarak, arguing that believers, 
even if they are only nominally Muslim, should obey the ruler in order to avoid 
chaos (Al-Anani & Malik, 2013). After Mubarak’s downfall, when the decision to 
hold an election was taken, however, these groups decided to participate in 
the elections out of “necessity”, despite their initial opposition to democracy, 
which they considered un-Islamic. Al-Anani and Malik (2013) note that the Salafi 
parties claimed that one of the major reasons they had to change their position 
was that they wanted to ensure that Egypt’s Islamic identity could be protected 
against liberals and secularists.
An offspring of the MB, the moderate Islamist party, Al-Wasat was founded 
in 2002 as a result of disagreements within the MB between its relatively young 
and educated members on the one hand, and its older members on the other. 
Al-Wasat distanced itself from the MB and developed a new party program that 
embraced a ‘civilizational’ concept of Islam, which is more inclusive towards 
women and Copts than more established versions of Islam are (Stacher, 2002; 
Wickham, 2004). Its founders include Copts and former members of the MB.
The non-Islamist parties were not in serious contention in the elections. 
Among these parties, the most visible were al-Wafd, which is Egypt’s oldest 
liberal political party, and the Egyptian Bloc, an electoral alliance of the Free 
Egyptians, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, and Tagammu. Promoting a 
vision of a ‘new Egypt’ (Hassan, 2013), the Egyptian Bloc campaigned vehe-
mently against the Islamist bloc, as did the smaller Leftist parties. Further, the 
Egyptian Bloc opposed the attempts of the Islamist parties to make Sharia a 
source of legislation and Islam the official religion of the state (Al-Anani, 2012; 
Hassan, 2013).
In sum, it is difficult to have clear and flat expectations on the relationship 
between support for democracy and voting patterns in 2011–2012 Egyptian 
elections. All of the supporters of political parties running in the elections could 
be expected to support democracy as an ideal regime to a certain extent. This 
support might get smaller among Al-Nour supporters compared to FJP sup-
porters, especially considering the claim that Salafi party considered the elec-
tions as an instrument in order to impose its Islamist regime in the country. It 
is difficult to argue that support for democracy would change the likelihood 
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of voting for the rest of the relevant parties in the system, i.e., the FJP, al-Wasat, 
al-Wafd and the Egyptian Bloc. Given that the MB moderated its position on 
a number of issues, including the rights of women and members of minority 
groups, and given that public support for democracy and Sharia may overlap 
to some extent, the expectation is that the correlation between being in favour 
of democracy and the likelihood of voting for a non-Islamist party to be weak-
ened somewhat. Regarding secular politics, those who did not want religious 
authorities were expected to have a high level of involvement in politics voted 
for non-Islamist parties.
Survey & analysis
The survey5 was conducted in Egypt between 12 January and 25 January 2012, 
with a sample of adults over the age of eighteen. Stratified random sampling 
was employed in order to capture minority religious groups who are heavily 
concentrated in several governorates and cities. The survey was run by GENAR, 
a major public opinion research company in Turkey, in collaboration with their 
local partner in Egypt. The pilot study was conducted about one month before 
the survey was launched. The sample was derived from Cairo, Alexandria, Giza, 
Qalyubia, Asyut, Gharbia, Qena, al Sharqia, Dakahlia, Faiyum, Beheira, Minya and 
Monufia, i.e., the governorates where most of Egypt’s citizens live. Then, each 
governorate was divided into urban and rural areas. Later, cities, towns and 
villages from urban and rural areas in each governorate were chosen. However, 
villages in distant rural areas were excluded because of the cost, time and diffi-
culty involved in travelling to them. The sample, therefore, does not represent 
the most rural citizens. Afterward, using stratified random sampling was used 
and households and individuals in those areas by age and gender quotas were 
selected. In case there was no response, the pollster moved to the next house-
hold, which was randomly chosen. The interviewees with 18 years and above 
in households were chosen with the most recent birthday. Even though the 
sample size was 1100, ‘no response’ and ‘do not know’ observations reduced 
the sample size to 664 and 643 in two main multivariate analyses, respectively.6
Dependent variable
In order to capture the party choice, the respondents were asked which political 
party they had voted for in the last election. Not surprisingly, the majority of 
the respondents claimed that they had voted for the FJP, al-Nour, al-Wafd, the 
Egyptian Bloc, or al-Wasat. Although other political parties were also referenced, 
only those cited by at least 2 percent of the respondents are included. It should 
also be noted note that a significant number of respondents either had not 
voted or did not want to respond to this question. Regarding these features of 
the survey, the statistical analysis is estimated by excluding those who had not 
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voted, given that the study’s focus is determining the popular base of political 
parties in the system. The substantial results of the statistical analysis do not 
change when non-voters are included in the analysis. The FJP voters constitute 
the base category in the analysis.
Independent variables
The first set of main explanatory variables measures support for democracy. As 
support for democracy has at least two aspects, it is conceptualized as ‘attitudes 
toward how well democracy performs’ and ‘attitudes toward democracy as the 
ideal political system,’ which is a prevalent approach in the literature (Ciftci, 
2010). Three items were used, as discussed in the Support for Democracy sec-
tion. The factor analysis suggests that these three items are loaded onto one 
underlying factor, which is referred to as ‘support for democratic governance.’ 
After the initial analysis, each variable was recoded from 0 to 4 with 4 indicating 
the highest level of support for democracy, and then they were added up to 
create the index. The variable ranges from 0 to 12. The Cronbach’s alpha score 
is 0.83.
The second conceptualization of support for democracy is based on citizens’ 
normative judgments about democracy as a political system. In order to cap-
ture the respondents’ attitudes, they were asked to respond to an item about 
whether democracy is the ideal political system.
As discussed, there is a significant cleavage in Egyptian society based on the 
role of religion in politics. The variable used to measure support for seculariza-
tion is also an index composed of three items. The factor analysis determined 
that a single factor underlies the responses to these three items. Based on the 
results of the alpha reliability test, it is possible to become more confident that 
the new variables were sufficiently variable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80). The varia-
ble was recoded, now ranging from 0 to 12, with 12 indicating the highest level 
of support for secularization. The expectation is that people who have secular 
attitudes are more likely to vote for non-Islamist parties, i.e., the Egyptian Bloc, 
al-Wafd and, to a lesser extent, al-Wasat, than for the FJP.
The last set of main independent variables indicates individual piety, which 
is measured as self-perceived religiosity. The respondents were asked to assess 
their religiosity as low, medium, or high. As with the secularization variable, the 
expectation is that Muslim respondents who see themselves as highly religious 
tended to vote for Islamist parties. A recent study on individuals’ party prefer-
ences found that religiosity does not have any impact on vote choice (Masoud, 
2013). The inclusion of the religiosity variable does not change the substantive 
interpretation of the main explanatory variables. However, it did significantly 
reduce the overall sample. Therefore, the multivariate imputation technique 
was used for the religiosity variable.7
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In the economic voting literature, it has been argued that people’s perception 
of the economic situation significantly influences the way they vote. In a context 
where the previous regime party (National Democratic Party) and its successor 
did not compete in the elections, evaluations of the previous government’s 
economic performance or retrospective voting do not tell us much. Because 
of their emphasis on social justice, Islamist parties can be expected to do well 
among those who have either have a negative view of the national economy or 
who have experienced some economic hardship within the household. Further, 
Islamist parties usually have well-established networks of economic assistance, 
which essentially develop into a form of clientalism – or even vote-buying in 
some instances. This might lead to greater electoral support among poor cit-
izens (Harik, 1996; Delibas, 2015; Woltering, 2002). Generally speaking, a poor 
economy is a robust indicator of support for Islamist parties, especially among 
people of low socioeconomic status, as Masoud (2014) found Islamists are more 
successful in convincing the electorate of their ability to redistribute wealth. 
This does not mean that Islamist parties do not receive support from those in 
the middle and upper classes. In fact, some researchers have found that people 
from these socioeconomic classes are the main source of popular support for 
Islamist parties (Waltz ,1986; Woltering, 2002; Pellicer & Wegner, 2014).
In order to capture the respondents’ views on the economic situation of 
their households and country, the survey included two direct questions. The 
first involved the household: ‘Compared to the last 12 months, how has your 
household economy changed?’ The second question was ‘How do you assess 
today’s national economy compared to 12 months ago?’ The response rate for 
both questions was low; therefore, ‘better’ and ‘almost the same’ were recoded 
as 0 and ‘worse’ as 1.
Public employees who have stable but low-paid jobs may have distinct 
party preferences. For example, whenever demonstrations erupted in Egypt 
under Mubarak, the regime increased public employees’ salaries significantly, 
which suggest that the regime considered dissatisfaction on the part of such 
employees to be a significant threat to its rule. In response, some Islamist groups, 
mainly the MB, undertook the redistribution responsibilities of the state in some 
regions. This step that may have created anxiety among public employees 
about the possibility of losing their status should the Islamists win the elections 
and redistribute wealth to citizens of lower socioeconomic status, who were 
expected to be the Islamists’ chief source of support.
Egypt has a significant Coptic population, and although it is impossible to 
offer an exact figure for its size, estimates range from 10 to 16 per cent (Tadros, 
2013). Fourteen percent identified themselves as Coptic and they voted for 
non-Islamist parties for several reasons. First, they were targeted by radical 
Islamist groups, which resulted in a number of deaths. Second, even though the 
FJP repeatedly announced during the campaign that Copts would be treated as 
equal citizens, this message did not alleviate the Christian minority’s concerns.8 
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Copts and those of other Christian denominations were coded as 1; otherwise 
respondents were coded as 0.
The 2011–2012 parliamentary elections in Egypt were unique given that 
Egyptian citizens not only voted for a party to govern them but for the config-
uration of the country’s parliament. In this election, Egyptians chose among 
models of political governance and state–religion relations. Some of the gov-
ernments in the Middle East region marketed their version of political Islam to 
the Egyptian citizenry (Ciftci & Tezcur, 2015). In order to measure the extent to 
which Egyptians support some of the models promoted by other countries, the 
survey included an item asking them to indicate whether they agreed that Egypt 
should adopt the American, Turkish, or Saudi Arabian model.
Results
A multinomial logit analysis was run, holding the FJP as the base category, in 
order to predict individual vote choice. In the analysis, MNL was preferable to 
its more complex probit alternative because voters have a fixed, stable pool of 
alternatives in elections and the IIA property is neither restrictive nor relevant 
(Dow & Endersby, 2004).
Table 3 presents the results of the multivariate statistical analysis. There are 
two models to test for the effect of support for democracy and support for 
secularization on vote choice in Egypt. The first model specification includes 
only two of the main explanatory variables. In this model, one of the intentions 
is to show the effect of citizens’ attitudes towards democratic performance and 
democracy as an ideal political system on their party preferences. Table 3 indi-
cates the results of this model, but it is not easy to interpret these results by 
looking at the table. Therefore, the results are interpreted by calculating the 
marginal effect predictions for each individual’s party choice.
The base category is vote choice for the FJP. Other choices are al-Nour, al-Wa-
sat, al-Wafd and the Egyptian Bloc. Interestingly, two measures for support for 
democracy differ in terms of their effects on the probability of voting for a given 
party. The expectation was that the extent to which the respondents indicated 
support for democracy would not vary significantly on the basis of the party, 
whether Islamist or non-Islamist, for which they voted. The coefficients suggest 
that there is no statistically significant difference between voting for the FJP or 
al-Nour, which means that support for democracy does not exert any significant 
influence over the choice between the two largest Islamist parties.
In regard to a pairwise comparison of secular parties with the probability of 
voting for the FJP, the reverse relationship between the two measures pertaining 
to support for democracy is still present. Neither of the support for the democ-
racy variables is statistically significant for al-Wasat, the variables differ signifi-
cantly between the respondents who voted for al-Wafd and those who voted 
for the Egyptian Bloc. The probability of voting for al-Wafd compared to the 
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probability of voting for the FJP increased by 2.8 per cent for one-unit increase 
in attitudes towards democracy as the ideal political system. The increase in the 
probability of voting for the Egyptian Bloc is 2.9 per cent for each unit change 
when all other exogenous factors are set to their means or modes.
In the second model, all the main explanatory variables were included. The 
results of the second model are presented in Table 4. According to this model, 
the base probability of voting for the FJP is 45.15 per cent when all exogenous 
factors are held at their mean or modal values. This probability decreased 2.8 
per cent on average for each unit increase in support for secularization. The 
probability of voting for al-Nour decreased 2.2 per cent on average as support 
for secular politics increased. Again, in line with the theoretical expectations, 
the probability of voting for the secular parties compared to for the FJP was 
consistently higher for respondents who reported a high level of support for 
secularization compared with those who reported a low a moderate level of sup-
port. A one-unit increase in support for secularization reflects a 1.1percent and 
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Table 3. Multinomial logit results: party choice of Egyptians in 2011–2012 elections.
Notes: Standard errors are below coeﬃcient estimates. Results are calculated based on 1000 imputed data-
sets using STATA (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1). The base category for the model is the FJP.
Main variables        
Attitudes towards        
Al-Nour Al-Wasat Al-Wafd Egyptian Bloc
Performance of democracy −0.007 −0.116 −0.101* −0.141**
  0.042 0.084 0.062 0.065
Democracy as ideal system −0.037 0.222  0.572*** 0.523***
  0.12 0.217 0.183 0.176
Control variables        
U.S. as a Model −0.098 0.237* 0.197** 0.510**
  0.01 0.164 0.118 0.111
Turkey as a Model −0.613*** −0.084 −0.017 −0.338***
  0.115 0.219 0.164 0.136
Saudi Arabia as a model −0.046 −0.067 −0.097 −0.749***
  0.101 0.169 0.131 0.131
Christians −0.361 1.886** 2.333*** 3.491***
  1.254 1.055 0.859 0.789
Household economy 0.754*** −0.425 0.834** 0.024
  0.28 0.501 0.371 0.331
National economy −0.452 −0.491 −0.876** 0.007
  0.347 0.511 0.408 0.407
Female −0.092 −0.002 0.476 1.633***
  0.287 0.48 0.356 0.34
Age 0.003 −0.021 0.008 0.006
  0.011 0.022 0.014 0.013
Education −0.117 −0.022 0.598*** −0.309***
  0.096 0.197 0.196 0.122
Public employee 0.349 −0.048 −1.616*** −0.181
  0.359 0.629 0.66 0.44
Unemployed 0.305 0.488 −0.449 0.555
  0.408 0.642 0.54 0.496
Constant 2.712** −1.175 −6.316*** −0.165
  1.083 2 1.723 1.321
N 625 625 625 625
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1.6 per cent increase in the probability of voting for al-Wafd and the Egyptian 
Bloc, respectively.
In order to interpret these estimated percentages more intuitively, marginal 
effect graphs, based on the second (full) model, were constructed. Figure 1 sug-
gests that attitudes towards democratic governance did not have a substantial 
effect on the probability of voting for a given party. Although these attitudes 
did have some substantive effect in the first model, the effect disappeared when 
the individual religiosity and support for secularization variables were included 
in the model. These results are not surprising, as most of the respondents had 
a negative view of the performance of democracy.
When the conditional marginal effect of attitudes towards democracy as 
an ideal political system is considered, a different pattern can be discerned. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Multinomial logit results: party choice of Egyptians in 2011–2012 Elections.
Notes: Standard errors are below coeﬃcient estimates. Results are calculated based on 1000 imputed datasets 
using STATA (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1). The base category for the model is the FJP.
Main variables        
Attitudes towards        
Al-Nour Al-Wasat Al-Wafd Egyptian Bloc
 Performance of democracy −0.003 −0.047 −0.005 −0.038
  0.044 0.093 0.073 0.078
 Democracy as ideal system 0.038 0.099 0.367** 0.186
  0.132 0.241 0.196 0.199
Support for Secularization −0.041 0.298*** 0.475*** 0.594***
  0.046 0.088 0.075 0.079
Religiosity −0.471* 0.009 −0.443 −0.489
  0.289 0.73 0.621 0.602
Control variables        
U.S. as a model −0.074 0.189 0.099 0.392***
  0.105 0.179 0.134 0.133
Turkey as a model −0.519*** 0.092 −0.085 −0.428***
  0.113 0.263 0.19 0.17
Saudi Arabia as a model −0.01 0.097 0.035 −0.596***
  0.106 0.241 0.147 0.15
Christians −0.209 1.890** 2.328*** 3.528***
  1.262 1.078 0.898 0.848
Household economy −0.477** 0.36 −0.495* 0.055
  0.235 0.414 0.339 0.327
National economy 0.361 −0.038 0.532* −0.023
  0.281 0.462 0.348 0.391
Female −0.242 0.118 0.391 1.734***
  0.301 0.513 0.4 0.405
Age −0.002 −0.021 0 −0.004
  0.011 0.024 0.016 0.016
Education −0.163* −0.042 0.618*** −0.312**
  0.101 0.206 0.212 0.145
Public employee 0.322 −0.466 −1.367** 0.335
  0.386 0.828 0.706 0.528
Unemployed 0.26 0.733 −0.276 0.767
  0.422 0.686 0.616 0.606
Constant 3.628*** −4.311* −7.972*** −2.123
  1.313 2.873 2.398 2.037
N 607 607 607 607
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Figure 2 suggests that the marginal effect remained below zero for Islamist 
parties, whereas it is positive and slightly significant for secular parties. The 
respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that democracy is the best political 
system were more likely to support non-Islamist parties than Islamist parties. 
Overall, the FJP and al-Nour in regard to obtaining votes from both those who 
were sceptical of democracy and those who supported it.
Figure 3 presents the conditional marginal effects for support for seculariza-
tion, which clearly reveal that the pattern is quite different from that for support 
for democracy. Moving from the minimum support for secularization to its mean 
shows a significant drop in its effect on the probability of voting for the Islamist 
parties, the FJP and al-Nour. The trend changes towards higher scores of support 
for secularization (after nine for the FJP and after eight for al-Nour), when the 
marginal effect of support for secularization increases. Exactly the same trend 
is observable for the secular parties as well, and the main reason for this trend 
is the effect of other control variables and the distribution of the respondents 
in support of secularization. The positive effect of support for secularization is 
statistically significant. For the first half of the support scores, there is a statis-
tically significant positive effect on the probability of voting for al-Wasat and 
al-Wafd. For the second half of the support scores, however, higher support for 
secularization reduces the likelihood of having voted for these two parties. It is 
interesting that those with the highest secularization score were less likely to 
vote for al-Wafd. Figure 4 also suggests that people with higher secularization 
scores were more likely to vote for the Egyptian Bloc, except for the highest 
score of secularization for which the marginal effect is not statistically significant.
The findings suggest that secular parties appeal to respondents with mod-
erate and high attitudes towards secularization. Islamist parties, in contrast, 
received support from respondents with a low inclination towards seculariza-
tion. However, as Tessler and Gao (2005) have pointed out, it should also be con-
sidered that it is possible to support democracy at a high level and yet support 
secularization at a low level, and likewise it is possible to support democracy 
at a low level and yet support secularization as a high level. Those who prefer 
Islamic democracy may differ in their party preferences, as may those who prefer 
secular authoritarianism. Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate these possibilities, using 
two “attitudes toward democracy” variables. Figure 5 shows that support for 
democratic governance is not moderated by support for secularization; the 
confidence intervals of marginal effects, including zero for all parties, clearly 
suggest this interpretation. Medium and high support for democracy as the 
ideal political system and for secularization correlated with decreased support 
for the FJP. The effect for secular parties is positive, but again the impact is not 
statistically significant.
In terms of economic voting, the results for both household and national 
economic retrospective considerations are not significant, except voting for the 
Salafis. Egyptians who had negative perceptions about the economic conditions 
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in their households were less likely to vote for Al-Nour compared to the FJP. In 
other words, supporters of the MB movement were the ones who had more 
positive evaluations of household economy in the last 12 months. Other than 
this specific result, though, retrospective voting was not in effect in Egyptian 
elections. This result is in congruence with the literature. For instance, Swank and 
Eisinga (1999) empirically show that voting patterns in multi-party systems with 
proportional representation are not influenced by economic factors. Moreover, 
voting patterns in transition democracies in Eastern Europe show that voters 
tend to vote prospectively rather than retrospectively regarding their expected 
future best interests (Fidrmuc, 2000a, 2000b).
Gender difference only plays a role in voting for the Egyptian Bloc, the broad-
est secular coalition, compared to voting for the FJP. Being a woman can increase 
the probability of voting for the Egyptian Bloc by 15 per cent, relative to voting 
for the FJP. It is also not a surprise to see that there is a negative relationship 
between being a woman and supporting the Salafi political movement even 
though this relationship is not statistically significant. It has been a well-known 
fact that Salafis had extremely conservative views on women’s participation in 
public life (Brown, 2013).
While age is not statistically significant in any of the models of vote choice, 
as educational level increased, the respondents were less likely to vote for the 
Egyptian Bloc, but more likely to vote for al-Wafd, compared to voting for the 
FJP. The finding for the Egyptian Bloc is surprising, and it may be due to several 
factors. First, the MB’s support base has changed to include relatively more 
educated people over time. Second, the underrepresentation of people with a 
low level of education, especially in rural areas, in the sample may have influ-
enced this result.
In terms of employment status of survey respondents, the unemployment 
did not play a significant role in choosing any political party to support, and 
this result is consistent with previous results in the literature (Elsayyad & Hanafy, 
2014: 124). Being a public employee did not have a significant effect on vot-
ing either, except in regard to voting for al-Wafd. The probability of voting for 
al-Wafd compared to voting for the FJP was lower for respondents who were 
public employees. The expectation was that seeing a positive relationship 
between voting for secular parties and serving in the public sector; however, 
this was not the case. One possible reason for this result is that public employers’ 
low wages relative to private sector in spite of high job security (Said, 2012). 
The uprisings and fall of Mubarak’s authoritarian regimes might have created 
the conditions for public workers to demonstrate their discontent with public 
policy and therefore let them support Islamists.
Coptic Christians are the largest Christian denomination in Egypt and they 
have been targeted by the Islamists during Mubarak’s authoritarian regime. The 
FJP have made some efforts to signal both Copts and international community 
that Christians will be treated equally if a government controlled by the Muslim 
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Brotherhood came to power following the elections. However, the results show 
that these electoral campaign efforts have not paid off for the FJP. A recent study 
finds that minorities in the Middle East differ in their support for democracy or 
authoritarianism, which means that minorities who perceive threat for their 
status are less likely to support democratization process in transition periods 
(Belge & Karakoç, 2015). Copts’ support for secular parties relative to the FJP 
can be interpreted as a reaction against Islamists who have been perceived 
as a general threat towards their identity. And in the lack of representation of 
old regime forces in 2011–2012 elections, Copts aligned with secular political 
parties against Islamists.
The last group of control variables were designed to test whether being sym-
pathetic towards the political model of another country affects voting decision, 
or not. In countries experiencing a democratic transition, political elites are 
seeking successful models to adopt in designing their own political system. One 
reason for this might be that emulating another country’s or movement’s model 
can provide a way to manage governing for elites with limited experience in 
regard to ruling. Additionally, a decision to adopt a model can be employed as 
both a domestic and international signaling mechanism. At the domestic level, 
elites can use the model country to convince citizens that they are sophisticated 
enough to pick reputable building blocks in governing the country. What is more 
also, new elites require to develop good relationships with foreign countries, 
and typically those countries are Western democracies that are providing foreign 
aid. As a result, by promoting a model that fulfills Western criteria for democracy 
and secularism, elites can expect to draw on Western support in transitioning 
to democratic governance.
While the results for model country discussion do not indicate any significant 
effect on voting for Al-Wasat and Al-Wafd, consideration of Turkey as a model 
for Egypt decreased the likelihood to vote both for Al-Nour and the Egyptian 
Bloc relative to voting for the FJP. The same negative relationship still holds for 
the Egyptian Bloc voters in regard to attitude towards Saudi Arabia as a model 
country for Egypt. Respondents who had a positive attitude towards the US as 
a model were more likely to vote for the Egyptian Bloc. However, this tendency 
did not affect individuals’ decisions to vote for other parties, compared to voting 
for the FJP.
It is not surprising to see that Egyptians were not allured by any of these 
possible models, especially if Egypt’s role in modern history of the Middle East 
is considered. Egypt, under the leadership of Nasser, has been the most influ-
ential country in the region, at least until the heavy loss in the Arab–Israeli War 
of 1967. The narrative that Egypt is the predominant force in the Arab world 
has shaped the Egyptian national identity and this is why Egyptians have not 
evaluated another country, whether it is Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or the US, as a 
model in a positive manner.
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Conclusion
The failure of the democratic transition associated with the Arab Uprisings 
fostered scepticism regarding the likelihood of democracy in the Middle East. 
However, this is not the first time that a democratic uprising has failed and yet 
paved the way for a democratic system to succeed over time. For example, 
the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the Prague Spring in 1968, and Poland’s 
Solidarity in 1981 not only fostered a spirit of democracy among the publics 
concerned, they also eroded the legitimacy of the repressive regimes they chal-
lenged (Stepan & Linz, 2013). The original survey conducted in Egypt during the 
transition period shows a similar pattern regarding public support for democ-
racy. Egyptian citizens strongly and widely view democracy as the ideal political 
system; however, the same is not true of their views regarding democracy’s 
performance. Overall, on that count, support for democracy – both in terms of 
governance and as an ideal system – did not have a marked influence on vote 
choice.
The present research shows that attitude towards the role of religion in pol-
itics, but not towards personal religiosity, had a significant impact on voting 
choices. This research also echoes an important observation noted in previous 
studies: Egyptian society is quite different from Western societies in terms of 
the impact of individual religiosity on voters’ preferences. In Europe, being more 
religious increases the likelihood of voting for Christian democrats (Van der 
Brug et al., 2009; Raymond, 2011). According to the survey, Egyptian society is 
characterized by a high level of religiosity such that the extent to which people 
are religious does not vary much between supporters of Islamist parties and 
supporters of secular parties. On the other hand, the results of the election 
show that three Islamist parties – the FJP, al-Nour and al-Wasat – received more 
than 74 per cent of the votes, which may be a reflection of the high degree of 
religiosity among Egypt’s citizenry in general.
Voters’ degree of support for secularization, however, is a major factor 
affecting their electoral choice. In particular, support for secular politics 
reduced support for the Salafi Bloc, which attracted voters who expressed the 
least support for secularization. Support for secularization also had a signifi-
cant, though less marked, negative effect on support for the FJP. Moderately 
secular voters were more likely to vote for al-Wasat, al-Wafd and the Egyptian 
Bloc than for any of the other parties, whereas highly secular voters were 
less likely to vote for al-Wafd and more likely to vote for the Egyptian Bloc. 
These results suggest that secularization does, in fact, exert an independent 
and significant effect on electoral choice. However, in examining the interac-
tional effect of secular and democratic attitudes, the study does not find any 
statistical impact on vote choice. This suggests that although voters might 
be classified as supporters of liberal democracy, Islamic democracy, secular 
authoritarianism, or Islamic theocracy (Tessler & Gao, 2005), the impact of 
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this classification on vote choice on the Egyptian parliamentary elections 
was weak. Support for public secularization was a major factor affecting vote 
choice in Egypt’s 2011–2012 parliamentary elections, but support for democ-
racy was not.
One curious question is how these empirical results based on the orig-
inal public opinion data would reflect and generalize to other countries in 
the MENA region, where Islamist parties enjoyed electoral victories, such as 
in Tunisia and Morocco. While it is difficult to make generalizations without 
having an empirical foundation, the divide over the role of Islam in politics 
is one of the most salient electoral issues in other countries in the region as 
well. This divide can be traced in the party systems of these countries, where 
political parties have been categorized as either Islamist or secular rather than 
rightist versus leftist ones. Due to the military coup and the backslide of the 
authoritarian regime in Egypt, it is even more important to organize further 
research in other countries in the region in order to see the variation in terms 
of the attitudes and perceptions of the role of Islam in politics and their effect 
on voting behaviour.
Notes
1.  The survey is as an outcome of a collaborative work and this information will be 
disclosed upon publication.
2.  However, those who strongly agreed that democracy is the ideal system, the 
60 per cent in the fourth round of the WVS is much higher than the 29 per cent 
reported in the present survey (Tessler & Gao, 2005).
3.  The fourth round of the WVS conducted in Egypt in 2000 shows that between 64 
and 70 per cent of Egyptians had a positive view of governance in democracies 
at that time – a figure that declined to around 15 per cent in the survey results 
reported herein. See Robbins (2015) for a different view based on the Arab 
Barometer.
4.  For more details: Guide to Egypt’s Transition by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace – http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/
articledetails.aspx?aid=100
5.  Additional information on the survey can be found in two recent studies: Köse 
et al. (2016) and Karakoç et al. (2016).
6.  The reported frequencies in the survey are not weighted. The decision has made 
after running statistical analysis with weighted frequencies and seen that the 
results were the same with the analysis run by unweighted frequencies.
7.  Given that the religiosity variable is nominal, STATA’s relevant imputation 
command is adopted.
8.  ‘Egypt Copts react to Islamist electoral win.’ by Yasmine Fathi. Ahramonline 
(Sunday 4 December 2011).
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